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Abstract 
This research is conducted in order to prove the impact of ownership 
structure, audit quality, and firm size toward earnings management through real 
activities manipulation proxied by REM Index. Purposive sampling is used as the 
sampling method. Samples included in this research are manufacturing firms 
listed in Indonesian Stock Exchange (IDX) during 2009-2014. Based on the 
criteria, there are 577 manufacturing firms used as a sample. Multiple regression 
is used to test the hypotheses. 
The result shows that institutional ownership, managerial ownership, and 
audit quality do not have any impact toward real earnings management. 
Otherwise, firm size positively and significantly impacts toward real earnings 
management. 
Keywords: ownership structure, institutional ownership, managerial 
ownership, audit quality, firm size, abnormal cash flow from 
operations, abnormal production, abnormal discretionary 
expenses, real earnings management, REM Index. 
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I. Introduction 
1.1. Background 
The financial statements are one of the source of information that can be used by 
external parties for decision making. One of the financial statements that indicate the 
company’s performance for a given period is income statement (Ujiyantho and 
Pramuka, 2007). Income numbers provided in the financial statements has the ability to 
affect users of the information in making decisions regarding to the company. Earnings 
information is part of the financial statements that are often modified through 
opportunistic actions of management to maximize their own benefits. Actions 
concerned with their own interests is done by managing the earnings so that profit can 
be adjusted, increased, or reduced in their own desire, such behavior is known as 
earnings management. 
Earnings management can be done either through accrual or real activities 
manipulation. Accrual manipulation is done by manipulating discretionary accruals. 
The accrual-based earnings management is related to unreasonable change in 
accounting policy or accounting estimates (e.g. the useful life of assets, the residual 
value of assets, the amount of doubtful accounts) and change in accounting choices (e.g. 
depreciation method) to meet target earnings numbers (Kiattikulwatana, 2014). The 
amount of discretionary accruals is depending on management’s decision; therefore, 
company’s earnings can be increased or decreased by depending on managers’ interest. 
Commonly, nowadays managers have more tendency to apply real activities 
manipulation rather than accrual. There are two reasons behind this condition. First, 
accrual manipulation often becomes the center of observation or inspection by the 
auditors and the regulators. Second, focus attention only on accrual manipulation is a 
risky action because the company may have limited flexibility to manage accrual 
(Graham et al., 2005). 
Institutional and managerial ownership as part of the components in the agency 
theory is an ownership percentage of ordinary shares held by financial institutions. 
Ownership by financial institutions will potentially increase the control and monitoring 
in the company, where managers as the owners will try to increase the quality of the 
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financial statements, as managers also act as the owners; therefore, it will be able to 
limit the real earnings management practice. 
The information asymmetry associated with the separation of ownership and 
control between principals (owners) and agents (management) create demand for 
external audit (Gerayli et al., 2011). External parties such as auditors is expected to limit 
the practice of accrual earnings management; therefore, the presence of auditors will 
increase the tendency of managers to engage in real earnings management, because 
when companies experience accounting inflexibility, companies will use real earnings 
management as an alternative (Ewert and Wagenhofer, 2005) in Radityo (2013). 
Firm size serves a proxy of political cost, considered to be very sensitive in case 
of earnings management behavior (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). The bigger the 
company will also have bigger political cost where it will lead to higher tax paid and 
upcoming new regulations which means the managers will have more tendency to alter 
the earnings reported together with the bigger the size of the company. 
1.2. Research Questions 
1. Does institutional ownership have a negative impact toward real earnings 
management? 
2. Does managerial ownership have a negative impact toward real earnings 
management? 
3. Does audit quality have a positive impact toward real earnings management? 
4. Does firm size have a negative impact toward real earnings management? 
1.3. Research Objectives 
1. The impact of institutional ownership toward earnings management through 
real activities manipulation. 
2. The impact of managerial ownership toward earnings management through real 
activities manipulation. 
3. The impact of audit quality toward earnings management through real activities 
manipulation. 
4. The impact of firm size toward earnings management through real activities 
manipulation. 
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1.4. Research Contributions 
This research can give a contribution in theory relating to the impact of ownership 
structure, audit quality, and firm size toward real earnings management practice in 
Indonesia. A good governance limited to institutional and managerial ownership, quality 
audits, and firm size may not absolutely give quality financial statements, as there is a 
possibility to find any real activities manipulation in financial statements, therefore 
investors should be cautious and have a deep fundamental analysis before investing. 
 
II. Hypotheses Development 
2.1.1. Institutional Ownership and Real Earnings Management 
According to agency theory, institutional ownership in the company is one of the 
factors that may affect the company’s performance. Institutional investors as 
sophisticated investors will be able to control decisions made by the management 
through effective monitoring process. The institutional shareholders, different than 
common shareholders, have ability and knowledge that do not belong to common 
shareholders so they can provide more active monitoring that is difficult for smaller, 
more-passive or less-informed investors (Almazan, Hartzell and Starks, 2005), making 
them possible to reduce the ability of managers to opportunistically managing earnings 
(Alves, 2012). 
 The greater ownership of financial institutions, the greater the power of financial 
institutions to monitor the management and eventually the management is expected to 
be less engaged in earnings management practice through real activities manipulation. 
So, the hypothesis will be formulated as: 
H1 = Institutional ownership has a negative impact toward real earnings 
management. 
2.1.2. Managerial Ownership and Real Earnings Management 
Managerial ownership has the same function as institutional ownership, as it is 
intended to reduce the information asymmetry between shareholders and the 
management. The presence of managerial ownership is important in order to reduce 
information asymmetry, as stated by Jensen and Meckling (1976) that by increasing the 
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percentage of managerial ownership, the shareholders’ interests can be aligned with 
managers’ interests so it will reduce information asymmetry. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) stated that integrating interests of owners and 
managers may reduce the conflict of interests by giving shares to managers. If managers 
are owning company’s shares, managers will have more motivation to increase firm’s 
performance, where they also act as shareholders. 
The higher the managerial ownership, it is expected that lesser real earnings 
management practice engaged by the management. So, the hypothesis will be 
formulated as: 
H2 = Managerial ownership has a negative impact toward real earnings 
management. 
2.1.3. Audit Quality and Real Earnings Management 
Earnings management practices can be explained by the agency theory. Agency 
theory assumes that the agents have more information than the principals, because the 
principal cannot sustainably observe the agents’ activities. In a such condition, it is 
necessary to have a third party, namely auditor that is considered capable of aligning the 
interests of the principals (shareholders) and the agents (management) in managing and 
supervising the financial statements. Ardiati (2005) mentioned that high quality auditor 
is able to act as an effective deterrent for earnings management. Herawaty (2008) stated 
that audit quality is assessed from the role of auditors that having more accurate and 
effective training and auditing procedures, auditor independency, and the amount of 
human resources in order to provide certainty related to accounting numbers reported 
by the management. 
According to Johnson et al., 2002; Balsam et al., 2003, quality auditors may 
reduce accrual earnings management practice that may effect on accounting inflexibility 
of the clients. As the clients have such inflexibility, they have an alternative that is 
practicing real earnings management rather than accrual earnings management. The 
clients with stronger motivations to manipulate earnings will be more likely to engage 
in real earnings management (Radityo, 2013). 
The higher the quality audit, the higher level of real earnings management. So, the 
hypothesis will be formulated as: 
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H3 = Audit quality has a positive impact toward real earnings management. 
2.1.4. Firm Size and Real Earnings Management 
 According to political cost hypothesis, earnings management is practiced by the 
bigger firm because the management has a motivation to lower the number of earnings 
thus the political cost will decrease. Political cost hypothesis also explained that 
earnings management practice is caused by government’s regulation, for instance, tax 
establishment. The bigger firms are expected to engage more in earnings management 
compared to smaller firms, because the political cost hypothesis assumes that firms will 
tend to show their profits lower by using different accounting methods and procedures 
so that the firm does not attract the attention of politicians, who will have an eye on high 
profit industries (Deegan, 2009). 
The bigger the size of a firm, the higher level of real earnings management. So, 
the hypothesis will be formulated as: 
H4 = Firm size has a positive impact toward real earnings management. 
III. Research Methodology 
3.1. Research Population and Sample 
This research uses the population of all of the listed manufacturing firms in 
Indonesian Stock Exchange (IDX). Manufacturing firms are chosen because 
manufacturing firms tend to engage more in real earnings management more than non-
manufacturing firms (Oktorina dan Hutagaol, 2008).  
Purposive sampling method is used in choosing the sample, which is choosing the 
sample from populations based on the certain criteria (Mustakini, 2007). These criteria 
are: 
1. The financial statement is published in the research period (2009-2014). 
2. The financial statement is published in Rupiah currency. 
3.2. Type and Data Collection Method 
Type of data that will be used is secondary data which are financial statements of 
the manufacturing firm from 2009-2014 that accessed from Indonesian Stock Exchange 
(idx.co.id) and Indonesian Capital Market Directory (ICMD). 
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3.3. Operational Definition and Measurement of Research Variables 
3.3.1.  Independent Variables 
Independent variable is a variable which is not affected by any other variable. In 
this research, ownership structure (institutional and managerial ownership), audit 
quality, and firm size serve as independent variables. 
3.3.1.1. Institutional Ownership 
Beiner et al., (2003) defined institutional ownership as the percentage of voting 
rights owned by institutions. Institutional ownership is where shares are hold by 
financial institutions i.e. insurance company, banking company, pension fund company, 
and investment banking company (Siregar and Utama, 2005). 
INST = 
Shares held by institutional firms
Outstanding share capital
 
3.3.1.2.Managerial Ownership 
According to Sujono and Soebiantoro (2007) in Sabrina (2010), managerial 
ownership is where shares are hold by the company’s management measured by 
percentage of shares owned by management. The management is CEO, directors, and 
managers of the firm (Alves, 2012). Managerial ownership is measured by percentage 
of shares owned by the management from total outstanding shares. 
MGOW = 
Shares held by the management
Outstanding share capital
 
3.3.1.3. Audit Quality 
Audit quality is measured by public accounting firm or KAP of auditors which is 
distinguished into two categories: KAP Big-4 and KAP non-Big 4. Big accounting firm 
or KAP (KAP Big-4) will conduct the audit with the perceived higher quality than the 
small accounting firm or KAP non-Big-4. Big-4 KAP in Indonesia are: 
1. KAP Purwantono, Sarwoko, and Sandjaja affiliated with Ernst and Young (E 
& Y); 
2. KAP Haryanto Sahari & Co. affiliated with PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC); 
3. KAP Osman Bing Satrio & Co. affiliated with Deloitte Touche Thomatsu 
(DTT); 
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4. KAP Siddharta, Siddharta, and Widjaja affiliated with Klynveld Peat Marwick 
Goerdeler (KPMG). 
Public accounting firm or KAP size is measured by nominal scale through dummy 
variable. Value 1 is representing the firm audited by KAP Big-4, whereas value 0 is for 
the firm audited by KAP non-Big 4. 
3.3.1.4. Firm Size 
Firm size is a value that indicates the size of the company, where it can be 
measured by using total assets. Assets, according to Kieso (2011), is a resource 
controlled by the entity as a result of past events and from which future economic 
benefits are expected to flow to the entity. Total assets are chosen as a proxy of firm 
size because it is relatively more stable than any other measure to assess the size of the 
company (Sudarmadji and Sularto, 2007).  
Firm size is obtained from the natural logarithm of total assets of the company in 
the research period. 
SIZE = ln (Total Assets) 
3.3.2. Dependent Variable 
In this research, earnings management through real activities manipulation will 
serve as the dependent variable. According to Roychowdury (2006), real earnings 
management is departures from normal operational practices, motivated by managers’ 
desire to mislead at least some stakeholders into believing certain financial reporting 
goals have been met in the normal course of operations. Real earnings management can 
be detected by using three proxies: abnormal cash flows, abnormal production costs, 
and abnormal discretionary expenditures. In this research, Roychowdury (2006) model 
are used: 
𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡 
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡−1
=  𝛼0  (
1
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡−1
) + 𝛼1 (
 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡−1
) +   𝛼2 (
∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡−1
) +   έ𝑡    (1)   
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑡 
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡−1
=  𝛼0  (
1
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡−1
)+ 𝛼1 (
 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡−1
) +   𝛼2 (
∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡−1
) +
 𝛼3 (
∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡−1
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡−1
) +  έ𝑡                                                                                     (2)    
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𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑋𝑡 
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡−1
=  𝛼0  (
1
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡−1
) +  𝛼1 (
 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡−1
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡−1
) +  έ𝑡                          (3) 
Description:  
 CFO = cash flow from operations as reported on the statement of cash flows 
 PROD = production costs, defined as the sum of cost of goods sold and change in 
inventory 
 Assets = total assets 
 Sales = total sales 
 DISX = discretionary expenditures, defined as the sum of advertising expenses, 
R&D expenses, selling, general and administrative expenses (SG&A). 
Discretionary expenses are expenses occurred due to management’s discretionary 
(Carter, 2006). Salary and tax expenses are excluded as both of them are non-
discretionary. 
In this research, residuals are taken as level of abnormal cash flow from 
operations, abnormal production costs, and abnormal discretionary expenses. For the 
sake of convenience and uniformity, residuals of abnormal cash flow from operations 
and abnormal discretionary expenses are multiplied by -1 (Tabassum et. al., 2013). The 
higher the residuals means the higher level of real earnings management through cash 
flow from operations, abnormal production costs, or abnormal discretionary expenses. 
According to Tabassum et al. (2013), this research uses REM Index to measure the 
overall of real activities manipulation. 
REM Index is calculated by using the equation below: 
REM Index = −residuals AbnCFO + residuals AbnProd − residuals AbnDiscExp 
Description: 
Residuals Abn_CFO = Abnormal cash flow from operations residual 
Residuals Abn_Prod = Abnormal production residual 
Residuals Abn_DiscExp = Abnormal discretionary expenses residual 
3.4. Empirical Model 
To test the hypotheses, this research uses the following multiple linear regression 
model: 
EM = β0 + β1 INST + β2 MGOW + β3 AQ + β4 FS + ԑ 
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 EM = total residuals of earnings management through real activities 
manipulation 
 INST = institutional ownership 
 MGOW = managerial ownership 
 AQ = public accounting firm or KAP size 
 FS = firm size 
 ԑ = an error term 
3.5. Data Analysis Methods 
Data analysis methods used in this research include statistics descriptive analysis, 
normality test, classical assumption analysis (multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity, and 
autocorrelation), and multiple linear regression to test the hypotheses. 
 
IV. Descriptive Statistics Analysis and Discussion 
Descriptive statistics is an analysis that describes research data. Descriptive 
statistic that is used in this research includes minimum value, maximum value, and 
standard deviation. From the descriptive statistics analysis, EM (Real Earnings 
Management) as the dependent variable has the minimum value of -2.0339, maximum 
value of 1.714, average value of -0.0742, and the standard deviation of 0.4572. 
INST (Institutional Ownership) as an independent variable has the minimum 
value of 0.00, maximum value of 0.92, average value of 0.1422, and the standard 
deviation of 0.2308. MGOW (Managerial Ownership) as an independent variable has 
the minimum value of 0.00, maximum value of 0.33, average of 0.0101, and the standard 
deviation of 0.0373. AQ (Audit Quality) has the minimum value of 0, maximum value 
of 1, average value of 0.37, and the standard deviation of 0.482. 
Normality test is conducted by using One Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test. 
Based on normality test of 686 manufacturing firms as a sample, significance value 
showed 0.0000 ≤ 0.05, which means sample is not normally distributed. Therefore, 
trimming is conducted to eliminate outlier data to make sample normally distributed. 
Outlier identification is conducted, and found 109 samples need to be eliminated. After 
normality test is reconducted, significance value showed 0.057 ≤ 0.05, which means 
sample is normally distributed. 
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Multicollinearity test is conducted to test the correlation of independent variables 
in research model. Multicollinearity can be detected Multicollinearity can be detected 
by Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) and tolerance value (TOL) as a rule of thumb. Below 
is the result of multicollinearity test: 
Table 4.1 
Multicollinearity Test Result 
Variable 
Collinearity Statistics 
Tolerance VIF 
INST 0.986 1.014 
MGOW 0.962 1.039 
AQ 0.753 1.328 
SIZE 0.739 1.353 
 
Based on the table above, the multicollinearity test shows that tolerance value of 
each independent variable is higher than 0.1 and VIF value of each independent variable 
is lower than 10. This result means that there is no multicollinearity in this research. 
Heteroscedasticity test is conducted to test the regression model whether there is 
a dissimilarity of variance in residual from one observation to another observation. A 
good regression model should have a similarity of variance in residual 
(homoscedasticity) (Ghozali, 2009). Below is the result of heteroscedasticity test: 
Table 4.2 
Heteroscedasticity Test Result 
Variable Significance 
INST 0.891 
MGOW 0.153 
AQ 0.524 
SIZE 0.191 
 
Based on heteroscedasticity test, the significant value of institutional ownership 
(INST), Managerial Ownership (MGOW), Audit Quality (AQ), and Firm Size (SIZE) 
is more than 0.05 (0.891 > 0.05; 0.153 > 0.05; 0.524 > 0.05; 0.191 > 0.05), which means 
there is no heteroscedasticity in this research. 
The purpose of autocorrelation test is to test whether there is correlation between 
one observable residual to another residual. A good regression model possesses no 
autocorrelation. Autocorrelation test in this research is done by using Breusch-Godfrey 
Test. Below is the result of autocorrelation test: 
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Table 4.3 
Autocorrelation Test Result 
                   Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:  
     
     F-statistic 0.753783    Probability 0.6439 
Obs*R-squared 6.103997    Probability 0.6356 
     
Based on the table above, the Breusch-Godfrey test result shows that Probability 
Obs*R-Squared (0.6356) is higher than 0.05. This result proves that there is no 
autocorrelation in this research. 
The purpose of hypothesis testing is to measure the correlation between 
independent variable that affects the dependent variable. The results of multiple 
regression analysis are as follows:  
Table 4.4 
Research Model Regression Result 
Variable Coefficients (β) Prob. 
C -0.843 0.000 
INST 0.369 0.088 
MGOW 2.071 0.271 
AQ -0.265 0.130 
SIZE 0.049 0.002 
F-statistic 12.295 
Prob. (F-statistic) 0,000 
Adjusted R2 0.073 
Dependent Variable: EM 
 
Probability (F-statistic) value of 0.000 ≤ 0.05 shows that this research model is 
feasible to be conducted. Adjusted R2 value of 7.3% shows that institutional ownership, 
managerial ownership, audit quality, and firm size are able to explain the variation of 
EM by 7.3%, where the rest (92.7%) is explainable by other variables outside the 
research model. 
Hypothesis testing proves that institutional ownership, managerial ownership, and 
audit quality do not have any impact toward real earnings management, while firm size 
does have a positive significant impact toward real earnings management. Institutional 
ownership, in average, only consists of 14%, where mostly the institutional firms are 
not the majority owner in the sample companies. The institutional ownership cannot 
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limit the real earnings management practiced by manufacturing firms as they ignore the 
presence of the institutional investors while engaging in earnings management through 
real activities manipulation. 
Managerial ownership does not have any impact on real earnings management as 
in average, only 1% shares is owned by the management, therefore managerial 
ownership is not able to align the interests in order to reduce the conflict of interests 
caused by owners and managers. Audit quality does not have any impact on real 
earnings management, as the presumed higher quality auditor which is Big-4 public 
accounting firm audited 37% from total of 577 samples, 211 companies in detail. The 
rest is audited by non-Big-4 public accounting firm which has audited 63% from total 
of 577 samples, 366 companies in detail. The status of Big-4 auditors does not 
necessarily give a better quality audit than non-Big-4 auditors. According to Siregar 
and Utama (2005), the status of Big-4 public accounting firm may not be a proper proxy 
for audit quality in Indonesia. 
 Firm size has a positive significant impact towards real earnings management, 
thus the H4 is accepted. This result supports the political cost hypothesis which assumes 
that firms will tend to show their profits lower by using different accounting methods 
and procedures so that the firm does not attract the attention of politicians, who will 
have an eye on high profit industries (Deegan, 2009). 
 
V. Conclusion and Research Limitation and Suggestions 
This research is conducted to investigate the impact of institutional ownership, 
managerial ownership, audit quality, and firm size towards earnings management 
through real activities manipulation proxied by REM Index. This research involves 577 
companies listed in Indonesian Stock Exchange (IDX) for the year 2009-2014. As the 
research shows, institutional ownership, managerial ownership, audit quality does not 
give any significant impact towards earnings management through real activities 
manipulation. In the other hand, this research proves that firm size gives a positive 
significant impact towards earnings management through real activities manipulation.  
The limitation of the research is that its adjusted R² is only 7.3% means the 
independent research variables is able to explain 7.3% of variation in real earnings 
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management variable, while the rest (92.7%) is explainable by other variables outside 
the research model, means that there are more variables outside the research model that 
can explain and affect the research model. 
For the next research, non-manufacturing industries can be included to extend the 
result, not limited to manufacturing industries only. Related to low adjusted R², another 
proxy can also be included e.g. audit committee, audit fee, and audit industry 
specialization in order to extend the result. 
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